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Abstract 
 To achieve dynamic sustainable development in the contemporary 
domestic and world economy it is important to develop business clusters 
which create emerging industries and help to build social capital. In this 
article the author considers the institutional logic of business cluster and the 
nature of the transactions process between the members of this structure. The 
aim of the article was to show that clusters on the one hand are examples of 
institutions, and on the other hand they co-create institutions that enable the 
members of the cluster to satisfy their needs, regulate their activity, ensure 
the continuity of cooperation and integrate members around common goals 
and values. Dual approach to institutions indicates in this case that their 
function is to control and trigger the activities in the cluster. The paper 
presents a business cluster as an example of an institution which plays an 
essential role in contemporary socio-economic processes. It attempts also 
analysing the importance of clustering from the perspective of the theory of 
transaction costs, considering that the business cluster is always seen as a 
privileged place for the creation of social networks among firms because of 
the presence of trust and partnership in the economic transactions of co-
located actors that is facilitated by their proximity. The author stressed that 
the business cluster has a beneficial impact on the reduction of opportunistic 
attitudes of cluster members – and owing to this – on the decrease in 
transaction costs. 
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Introduction: 
 The processes of signing and completing economic deals are realised 
within various institutions that organize the market and pervade almost all 
the areas of business entities’ functioning. These institutions naturally 
determine the process of economic growth. Economic literature increasingly 
emphasises that economic growth does not only depend on the market 
conditions but also dynamic interactions between the elements of the Triple 
Helix Model (university-industry-government relationships), knowledge and 
innovation transfer, the creation of human capital and the activity of local 
institutions. Although the role of institutions in economic development does 
not raise any doubts (at least from the theoretical point of view), this area 
still lacks comprehensive and consistent empirical analyses. 
 In recent years, the term institution has again become a central focus 
of economists and other scholars studying the processes of cluster 
development, and the reasons why clusters have differed so greatly in their 
achievements on this front. In the literature on the subject, cluster is 
commonly perceived as a more or less formalised organisation that has been 
created on the basis of relatively sustainable and active relationships between 
the independent entities that have decided to closely cooperate to achieve 
diversified and long-term benefits for each of the parties involved. The 
relationships are based on open information exchange, and mutual trust, 
sharing common benefits and potential risk, commitment, partners’ 
autonomy, participation in decision making and also reciprocal influence, 
respect and responsibility. Taking into consideration numerous attributes of 
the cluster, which are identified by the researchers almost all over the world, 
it is impossible to recognise its institutional dimension. It is showed by 
norms, rules and a more or less formalised code of conduct, the structure of 
an organisation that is created to represent and fulfil the expectations of 
particular cluster members or coordination mechanisms that compose the 
functional framework for intra- and interorganisational behaviour. 
 The main purpose of this paper is to characterize of the selected 
aspects of the institutional dimension of contemporary business clusters. The 
author focuses on five key research questions within defined subject of the 
article: 
• what is distinctive (typical) for the institutional dimension of business 
clusters? 
• why business clusters are an example of institutional arrangements? 
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• why institutions within business clusters have a strategic importance 
for the development process of the cluster under conditions of 
uncertainty? 
• why the institutional dimension of cluster has an impact on social 
capital development? 
• why institutionalisation within business clusters has a positive impact 
on the reduction of transaction costs? 
 Such formulated research problem ensues from the fact that the 
constantly developing cluster theory, which treats clusters as a way of 
regulating enterprises’ behaviour, indicates that the present classic market 
regulations are being enriched with coopetition elements. Thus, what is of 
strategic importance in explaining clusters’ role and the regulatory ties 
created within their internal environment, which are reflected in the 
existence of competition and cooperation is New Institutional Economics. 
 The outline of the scientific considerations which has been presented 
in this article was conducted on the basis of theoretical research. The 
research process was dominated by two main models, that is, deductive and 
inductive. 
 
Heterogeneous Nature of The Institutions: 
 The term institution is used in different areas of economic theory and 
practice. The use of the term institution has become widespread in the social 
sciences in recent years, reflecting the growth in institutional economics and 
the use of the institution concept in several other disciplines, including 
philosophy, sociology, politics, and geography (Hodgson, 2006, p. 1). It is 
connected with the firm foundations of the institutional school on which the 
analysis of transaction categories and economic institutions has been 
developed by the subsequent neoinstitutional approach. The New 
Institutional Economics contributes to explaining economic growth and 
income differences by considering not only the standard factors of 
production but also institutions (Efendic and Pugh et al., 2011, p. 587).  
 Many researchers stress that contemporary institutional theory spans 
multiple levels of analysis and includes several loosely related conceptual 
streams developing in parallel. In political science institution is defined as an 
organized political entity (e.g. a nation), its organs, local government 
organisations, political parties and trade unions. In legal science the term 
institution is defined as a range of legal principles that regulate certain 
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groups of social relationships. Then, in sociology, this term refers to the firm 
elements of social order, settled and vested forms of activities, acknowledged 
ways of solving the problems of cooperation, community life or the 
organisation itself (Amenta and Ramsey, 2010, p. 16; Zucker, 1987, pp. 443-
446). Depending on what these institutions concern, to which area they relate 
and their characters themselves, their following types are distinguished: 
economic institutions, political institutions, social institutions, both formal 
and informal which comprehensively create the institutional system 
characteristic of a particular society. 
 In the literature on the subject institutions are defined in different 
senses and contexts. The term may be defined as: 
• general habits of action and thought, sustainable and prevalent way of 
thinking or acting which is embodied in traditions or customs of a 
particular group of people (Nelson et al., 2002, p. 268); 
• a set of socially prescribed patterns of correlated behaviour (Bush, 
1987, p. 1076); 
• the rules of the game in a society; more formally, they are the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction (North, 
1992, p. 5); 
• the effective rules of a social game in which individuals and their 
organisations are the players, where the rules of the game (laws, 
regulations, norms) and their enforcement mechanisms create 
constraints and incentives that shape the behaviour of decision 
makers (Eggertsson, 2013, pp. 1-5); 
• formal rules, informal constraints (norms of behaviour, conventions, 
and self-imposed codes of conduct) (North, 1992, p. 9); 
• some patterns of behaviour (e.g. negotiations, signing contracts, 
parties’ agreements), specific forms that define rights and obligations 
together with increasingly detailed legal regulations which define the 
permissible ways of conduct (Gruszecki, 2002, p. 203); 
• long-lasting elements of social order, settled and vested forms of 
activities, common and acknowledged ways of solving cooperation 
problems (Wajda, 2003, p. 25); 
• the kinds of structures that matter most in the social realm: they make 
up the stuff of social life, and the rules of the game in society or, 
more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interactions (Hodgson, 2006, p. 2); 
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• the rule that governs human behaviour and an institutional framework 
is a more or less coherent set of rules that shape and restrict human 
behaviour (Keizer, 2006, p. 5); 
• a system of social factors that conjointly generate a regularity of 
behaviour, where by social factors he means, man-made, nonphysical 
factors that are exogenous to each individual they influence, 
including rules, beliefs, norms and organisations (Greif, 2006, p. 30); 
• shared behavioural regularities or shared routines within a 
population, and shared mental models or shared solutions to recurrent 
problems of social interaction (Mantzavinos and North et al., 2004, p. 
77). 
 Taking into considerations various approaches of theoreticians and 
practitioners in defining institution, three significant categories of this term 
can be distinguished: norms, rules and more or less formalised code of 
conduct, organisations that are established to represent and fulfil the 
expectations of particular society’s members as well as coordination 
mechanisms that create a functional framework of the behaviour of the 
members of management processes (Nelson and Sampat, 2001, p. 33; 
Gagliardi, 2008, p. 417). In this sense, institutions that pervade almost all the 
areas of human activity are assigned with the array of functions: 
stabilization, regulation, cognition, integration or instrumental character 
(Schotter, 2011, pp. 10-19). These functions, among others, indicate that 
institutions are real enough, have been generated in the right time and place, 
adapt to the changing reality, limit the chaos, ensure freedom for groups and 
individuals, facilitate the interpersonal relation building and contribute to the 
synergy effects. For example the cognitive function refers to the information 
that institutions provide to the individual, including the indication of the 
likely action of other people, also includes their influence on the very 
perception that people have of reality, that is, on the way people select, 
organize and interpret information (Dequech, 2006, p. 118). The key role of 
institutions can be easy identified because they contribute to solving 
problems of coordination of agents’ plans; help to promote cooperative 
behaviour and overcome opportunism; make agents internalize externalities, 
and reduce uncertainty (Gagliardi, 2008, p. 419). 
 Institutions are linkage mechanisms that bridge across three kinds of 
social divides – they link micro systems of social interaction to meso (and 
macro) levels of organisation, they connect the symbolic with the material, 
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and the agentic with the structural (Mohr and White, 2008, p. 485). 
Williamson (2009, p. 371) shows that institutions are widely believed to be 
important for economic development but cannot be easily transplanted in 
order to spur economic development. North (1990, p. 6) emphasizes that the 
major role of institutions is “to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable 
(but not necessarily efficient) structure to human interaction” and points out 
that both formal and informal institutions are evolving and changing, thereby 
continually altering the choices available to us. The institutions constantly 
evolve to respond to changing circumstances (e.g., by protecting intellectual 
property rights), foster creativity, lower transaction costs, and encourage the 
process of creative destruction (Boliari, 2007, p. 5). 
  
Business Cluster - The Example of an Institution: 
 According to Porter (1998, p. 79), the business cluster represents a 
kind of new spatial organisational form in between arm’s-length markets on 
one hand and hierarchies, or vertical integration, on the other. This concept 
refers to a set of economic activities, economic entities, cooperation of the 
different partners (business, academia, local government, NGOs), formal and 
informal institutions, concentrated geographically (locally or regionally), 
which established a formal or informal relations between themselves, the 
horizontal and vertical, and the favour of the industrial sector through which 
they exchange information, knowledge and goods for the development of a 
common product and services (Radman-Funaric and Potnik-Galic, 2011, p. 
667). It evolves basing on geographical proximity, develops over time, 
boosts competition and cooperation (co-opetition) resulting in innovation 
process, and potentially creates greater economic benefits through higher 
productivity, better knowledge management, and entrepreneurial 
opportunities (Chuluunbaatar and Luh et al., 2014, p. 553). Even though 
clusters inherently contribute to the development of industries (current and 
emerging) by creating economies of agglomeration, the past 35 years have 
observed different and sometimes contrasting development paths of the 
clusters in individual countries and regions. Many business clusters are now 
subject to intense global competition and global cooperation (global value 
chains) that has been magnified by domestic policies aimed at opening up 
and liberalizing the domestic markets (Wasimarif, 2012, p. 72). 
 Economic and management researchers indicate that the business 
clusters bring benefit to firms by institutional involvement in specialised 
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services and infrastructure, increasing productivity, enhancing innovation, 
and stimulating the growth of new businesses (e.g. spin-off company, start-
up) in a cluster environment. Firms in a cluster are oriented to competitive 
advantage by working together such as horizontal and vertical cooperation. 
Porter (1998, p. 80) strongly emphasizes that a cluster allows each member 
to benefit as if it had greater scale or as if it had joined with others formally – 
without requiring it to sacrifice its flexibility. The business cluster 
performance outcomes may follow from both a given cluster’s configuration 
and its internal governance processes i.e. cluster management (Tracey and 
Heide et al., 2014, p. 3). 
 The activities undertaken by entrepreneurs in a cluster environment 
take place within a particular institutional framework. In other words, 
behaviour and actions of cluster’s participants are determined, inter alia, by 
social institutions. In the course of time, relations in a cluster are 
institutionalised through joint observance of legal regulations, shaping of 
rules prevenient to the creation of both social ties and a system of values. 
 Clusters constitute an instance of an institutional structure 
(institutional arrangements) i.e., a more or less formalised organisation being 
a group of cooperating partners, in possession of particular material and 
immaterial resources. Certain members of such an organisation, basing on its 
institutional structure, attempt to achieve their own goals, both individual 
and those set within the structure. These types of organisations are special 
institutions that involve: criteria to establish their boundaries and to 
distinguish their members from non-members, principles of sovereignty 
concerning who is in charge, and chains of command delineating 
responsibilities within the organisation (Hodgson, 2006, p. 8). The 
relationship between organisations and institutions lies at the heart of 
organisational studies. 
 Cluster is a complex social systems rooted in space (Pulles and 
Schiele, 2013, p. 100). Social interactions among spatially proximate actors 
within a cluster can motivate the deepening of existing relationships or 
formation of new linkages (Eisingerich and Bell et al., 2010, p. 251). 
Consequently, in this case, a cluster constitutes a unique entity organisation, 
in which a human being is a subject having a sense of freedom, not an object 
of manipulation. Furthermore, this human being is not a means to an aim, but 
an aim in itself. Entity organisation refers to people’s cooperation both in a 
group and in a particular society (Narski, 1997, p. 15). Moreover, a cluster is 
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a goal-oriented organisation, created by people, separated from an 
environment, and simultaneously open to relations with the environment, 
since it draws and transfers energy, information or values as a result of them. 
Clusters considered as a contemporary organisation form established, in the 
course of time, their s own institutions, creating an increasingly complex 
chain of organisational connections and institutional interactions (Osadnik, 
1996, p. 93). 
 The cluster is a typical institution, since it is associated with a process 
of group contribution to the implementation of common goals, projects, and 
agreements between cluster’s members. It is vital that while implementing 
common plans outlined in such a way, certain partners integrate thinking 
about common benefits. A partner agreement within the cluster, however, 
allows the termination of this agreement with a notification in cases when 
further common activity would have negative impact on financial outcomes 
of one of the partnership parties (Haynes and Allen, 2001, p. 177; Black and 
Akintoye et al., 2000, p. 423). In many cases, partners associated with the 
implementation of certain projects consent to formalise the cooperation in a 
cluster (formalisation of a cluster) through the creation of a legal-
organisational unit gathering partners e.g., in a form of consortium, 
association etc. In this case, the cluster encompasses members who met 
formal membership criteria, creating atmosphere conducive to open 
interaction and cooperation under the implementation of the adopted 
development strategy. 
 The business cluster treated as an institution is conducive to the 
accumulation of social capital. Social capital can be understood as a form of 
capital, like financial or human capital, that is embedded in the relationships 
between individuals, and can be measured at the individual or group level 
(Ellison and Steinfield et al., 2010, p. 3). According to Lin (1999, p. 35), 
social capital is the investment in social relations and resources embedded in 
a social structure which are accessed and/or mobilised in purposive action 
(social capital contains three ingredients: resources embedded in a social 
structure; accessibility to such social resources for individuals; and use or 
mobilization of such social resources by individuals in purposive actions). 
This capital as a “glue” that holds societies together refers to the internal, 
social and cultural coherence of a society, to norms and values which control 
human interactions, as well as to institutions which implement these 
interactions (Acar, 2011, p. 456). A set of basic values shared within one 
European Scientific Journal December 2015 edition vol.11, No.34 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
21 
social group (e.g., honesty, truthfulness, fulfiling agreements, engagement, 
keeping one’s word, reliability in exercising one’s duties) underlies the 
social capital. 
 Social capital is an important societal resource and has been defined 
as generalized trust, access to and membership in various types of networks, 
as well as norms of reciprocity (Rothstein, Stolle, 2008, p. 441). The capital 
is developed thanks to networks between various entities, shaped by cultural 
traditions, a system of values, entrepreneurial culture, norms of social 
conduct and common attitudes conducive to cooperation. Putnam (1993, pp. 
35-42) thus argued that social capital is a feature of social organisation, such 
as networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for 
mutual benefit. Bourdieu defines the volume of social capital as a function of 
the size of the network and the volume of capital (economic, cultural and 
symbolic) possessed by networked individuals (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1992, p. 119). He argues that social capital is the sum of the resources, actual 
or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a 
durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual 
acquaintance and recognition (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 119). 
 Huber (2009, p. 166) emphasizes that the social capital of a business 
cluster is the knowledge the members of the cluster are able to potentially 
access or actually mobilise for work activities through internal and external 
social networks. Moreover, he believes that the kind of capital depends on 
the extent to which individuals in cluster organisations are able to acquire 
work-related knowledge from individuals in other cluster organisations as 
well as from individuals in organisations outside the cluster (Huber, 2009, 
pp. 166-167). What sometimes is of considerable significance in the process 
of accumulating cluster’s social capital is a cooperative institutional 
arrangement presenting high level of institution’s integration (Zabkowicz, 
2001, p. 25). 
 It is emphasised in the literature on the subject that a social capital is 
conducive to the establishment of new and effective relations in a cluster, 
therefore to a maximal and balanced use of resources by possibly the biggest 
number of its members. High level of such capital is indeed essential for 
every entrepreneur in a cluster’s structure, since it (Fazlagic, 2004, p. 25; 
Dong and Jin et al., 2008, p. 822): 
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• facilitates problem solving in groups, as mutual trust reduces the 
number of conflicts, particularisms, inclinations to form oppositions 
and coalitions, destructive actions; 
• facilitates running a business, establishing contacts, thus stimulates 
the development of entrepreneurship; 
• increases people’s self-consciousness in the field of reciprocal 
connections. 
 In a cluster, firms have access to social capital as institutional actors, 
a resource that helps the development of norms for acceptable behaviour and 
the diffusion of information about behaviour (Kajikawa and Takeda et al., 
2010, p. 170). Social capital within a cluster influences the process of 
consolidating established interpersonal relations, facilitates coordination, 
communication and cooperation, facilitates the creation of new “links” in a 
special network, influences the establishment of cluster’s value, is conducive 
to faster implementation of goals and introduction of changes, enhances 
cluster’s effectiveness primarily through the facilitation of cooperation 
between its participants. Strong social norms and beliefs, associated with 
a high degree of closure of the social network, encourage compliance with 
local rules and customs and reduce the need for formal controls (Adler and 
Kwon, 2002, p. 29). The results of studies focusing on different aspects of 
social capital suggest that the positive effects of social capital during the 
early stage of cluster development, when few firms exist, may be replaced by 
congestion effects in mature clusters that include many firms (Staber, 2007, 
p. 511). 
  
Clustering - The Transaction Cost Approach: 
 Pragmatic roots of the clustering concept lie in the theory of 
transaction costs, which constitute a part of the theoretical core of the 
discipline of strategic management. Transaction costs theory explains the 
choice of organisational form as matching transactions that have certain 
transactional characteristics with the appropriate governance mechanisms 
(Kim and Mahoney, 2005, p. 232). According to this theory, an enterprise 
should undertake all these activities, in case of which transaction costs of 
purchasing products and services from external suppliers are higher than the 
costs of developing these products and services inside an enterprise 
(Williamson, 1981, pp. 548-577). Transaction costs comprise: the costs of 
obtaining information on the best suppliers, receivers and the most attractive 
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prices; the costs of signing a contract (the costs of finding a partner, the costs 
of negotiating the terms of a contract, the costs of possible claims and the 
costs of settling these claims); the costs of contract realisation and 
monitoring; the costs of contract evaluation; the costs of economic 
uncertainty (price changes, currency fluctuation, breaking cooperation). 
These costs are divided into ex ante and ex post transaction costs, where 
(Williamson, 1998, p. 390): 
• ex ante costs arise in the process of drafting and negotiating 
contracts, and change along with the object of transaction; 
• ex post costs comprise costs which are connected to: management 
structure, monitoring and evaluation, possible incompatibility, 
negotiations, provision of obligations security. 
 These costs, connected to business agreements (contracts), belong to 
the category of costs which are hard to percept, not always possible to 
identify and express in an unequivocally measurable way. Hagedorn (2015, 
p. 593) stresses that the transaction costs do not exclusively result from the 
physical procedure of transferring a unit of a good, service or resource from 
one point to another, but, in particular, from how the actors involved prepare 
for or respond to this physical change, which may have caused a conflict by 
incompatible use of natural resources between them. 
 An important source of transaction costs is opportunism, that is, a 
crafty endeavour to achieve one’s own goals, which is responsible for 
uncertainty between the parties to a transaction. Within transaction cost 
economics, opportunism is not only an assumption of human nature, but 
through the concept of behavioural uncertainty, opportunism may also be an 
attribute of transactions (Niesten and Jolink, 2012, p. 1031). In this case, as a 
result of partner’s opportunistic behaviour related to breaking the terms of a 
beforehand agreed contract, or amending a contract in a way that increases 
the advantage of one partner at the expense of the other, there arise various 
kinds of transaction costs, for instance ones that ensue form securing the 
terms of a contract, costs of gaining additional information, negotiating new 
terms of a contract, monitoring and evaluating contract realisation (Hodgson, 
2004, pp. 401-418). The threat of opportunism as well as its scope depends 
on the attractiveness and the level of transaction-specific investments, the 
level of uncertainty, risk and complexity of a transaction as well as 
inclination towards opportunism. 
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 Transaction costs are certainly a part of the cost structure of doing 
business in a particular location, and lowering transaction costs (though 
lower costs for labour, capital, supplies, or other factors can overwhelm the 
overall savings in transaction costs offered by a particular cluster) is often 
the reason for forming a business cluster (Seeley, 2011, p. 90). McCann, 
Arita and Gordon (2002, pp. 649-651) argue that if we adopt a transaction-
costs perspective we can define three distinct types of business clusters, 
according to (Iammarino and McCann, 2006, pp. 1024-1027): 
• the nature of firms in the cluster (pure agglomeration) – inter-firm 
relations are inherently transient, loyalty between firms, nor are any 
particular relations long-term, firms are essentially atomistic, in the 
sense of having no market power, and they will continuously change 
their relations with other firms and customers in response to market 
arbitrage opportunities, thereby leading to intense local competition; 
• the nature of their relations (industrial complex) – long-term stable 
and predictable relations between the firms in the cluster, access to 
the cluster is therefore severely restricted both by high entry and exit 
costs, and the rationale for spatial clustering in these types of 
industries is that proximity is required primarily in order to minimise 
inter-firm transport transactions costs; 
• the transactions within the cluster (social network) – mutual trust 
relations between key decision making agents in different 
organisations may be at least as important as decision-making 
hierarchies within individual organisations, trust relations manifested 
by a variety of features, such as joint lobbying, joint ventures, 
informal alliances and reciprocal arrangements regarding trading 
relationships, key feature of such trust relations is an absence of 
opportunism, in that individual firms will not fear reprisals after any 
reorganisation of inter-firm relations. 
 These characteristics of business clusters are distinguished in terms 
of the nature of firms in the cluster structure and the nature of their relations 
and transactions undertaken within this structure. Moreover, these 
classifications are not explanatory theories, but they are based on the implicit 
assumptions underlying most of the existing literature on agglomeration and 
clustering concept (Iammarino and McCann, 2008, p. 15).  
 Institutionalisation in a cluster reduces opportunism (Waite and 
Williams, 2009, pp. 499-512), and owing to that it reduces also transaction 
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costs, as it increases the predictability of actions, and thus creates conditions 
facilitating the undertaking of rational actions. Particularly in the case of 
relative contracts based on the principles of partnership, there is a possibility 
of reducing and decreasing transaction costs chiefly through (Gluszek, 2004, 
p. 199; Rutkowska, 2003, p. 276): 
• the avoidance of contracting costs when it is not necessary to draw up 
a detailed contract, as it is very time-consuming and expensive (a 
need for trust is particularly visible at the lowest level of 
institutionalisation, namely, when a particular contract between 
contractors is signed); 
• the reduction of the costs of monitoring partners’ actions and their 
performance of obligations determined in a contract; 
• the reduction of costs connected to a complex adaptation, which 
ensues from the acceptance of partners’ gradual adjustment to the 
requirements of mutual cooperation, right from its beginning; 
• the avoidance of transaction costs, related to re-contracting the 
agreement due to the lack of time limit for the term of a relative 
contract. 
 According to Jankowska (2012, p. 118), owing to the fact that a 
cluster can be perceived as a way of regulating entrepreneurs’ behaviour, the 
relations inside a cluster help to reduce transaction costs, and the entities that 
change business partners in a cluster do not have to be afraid of great costs of 
undertaking this action due to a high level of trust between cluster members. 
 Zhang and Song (2009, p. 1747) stress that, the increased transaction 
costs, resulting from the increasing transaction amount of intermediate 
products and consumer trades, request efficient market organisation of an 
industrial cluster in the developing process of production, to reduce the 
transaction costs in various kinds of intermediate products and consumer 
products trading activities. These costs can be reduced because cluster 
members, closely bound in a geographical area, can share a complex social 
and cultural identity based on collective beliefs, values, conventions, and 
language. Also social cluster homogeneity together with mutual knowledge 
of one another accumulated through each firm’s own experience, foster a 
relational trust that reduces the risk of abusive behaviour in clustered 
transactions (Diez-Vial, 2011, p. 518). 
 The reduction of transaction costs within a business cluster 
constitutes one of the key signs of the increase in the effectiveness of its 
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functioning. It ensues from the fact that a cluster has a stronger mechanism 
of control and monitoring than the market, owing to a possibility of 
promoting real engagement of cluster members and eliminating from the 
group of cluster members the units that show an opportunistic attitude. The 
coordination of behaviour in a cluster on the basis of formal and informal 
institutions reduces the tendency to opportunistic behaviour. 
 In the practice of managing a cluster as an organisation more or less 
formalised, it is possible to strengthen institutions constituting the structure 
of management on the basis of social capital. Drawing up and signing 
contracts as formal institutions within a cluster supported by, e.g., informal 
institutions in a form of common norms and values (organisational culture, 
social capital) can facilitate present cooperation, including building trust 
capital. Thus, the coordination structure adopted and typical of a given 
cluster, creating stable institutional framework for a transaction to proceed in 
a cluster environment, can be conducive to the reduction of transaction costs. 
 
Conclusion 
 Presently, economic development depends on growth poles, 
innovative technologies, social capital as well as the institution. What is 
particularly beneficial from the viewpoint of economic development are 
these institutions which enable productive and stable cooperation. An 
example of such an institution is a cluster, which in the theory and practice 
of management is defined in the context of a contemporary organisation, an 
integrated set of rules, principles, values, intra- and interorganisational 
partnership, coordination mechanisms, which create the functional 
framework of business entities’ behaviour, including cluster members. What 
is possible owing to this institution which regulates behaviour of partnership 
parties is, among others, successful and effective cooperation, reduction of 
transaction costs and stimulation to economic activity. 
 However, what is necessary for proper functioning of a cluster as an 
institution and also proper fulfilment of its strategic role in socio-economic 
processes is permanent development of social capital. On the one hand a 
business cluster co-creates social capital, but on the other – it is influenced 
by social capital that is created by its external environment. This type of 
capital enables the access to other resources owned by other cluster 
members. What increases along with the increase of its level within a cluster 
is the activity of cluster members in designing and realising grass roots 
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development initiatives. Moreover, this situation can encourage to more 
complex and innovative undertakings, as it is not accompanied by the risk 
associated with cooperation with an unknown partner. Taking into 
considerations various approaches to defining social capital, or a wide range 
of benefits ensuing from a high level of this type of capital, it can be easily 
observed that social capital really determines the dynamics of cluster 
structure development. 
 Clusters create an individual institutional structure, on the other hand, 
however, they create institutional environment. In this case, the institutional 
structure of a cluster refers to, e.g., various kinds of norms, principles, 
systems of values (organisational culture), which form cluster members’ 
behaviour. Whereas institutional environment creates a broader set of 
factors, processes, rules of the game in the economy and society, it somehow 
determines the nature of the influence on the economy and society through 
resources allocation. 
 Institutions in a cluster can be forced upon a cluster society (e.g., by 
moral and social norms, business ethics, law). They can be also created 
spontaneously as a result of relationship evolution in a cluster. Rational 
framework and soft infrastructure of a cluster are critically important for 
cluster management. In this sense, institutions function in a cluster as a good 
which is readily available for cluster members and which is shared with 
others according to the need. The quality of this type of institutions in a 
cluster influences: stability of cluster structure, the efficiency of the 
fulfilment of common goals, undertaken investment decisions, organisation 
of a supply chain, intensity and the nature of the process of knowledge 
creation, etc. These institutions guarantee a proper fulfilment of contracts 
and obligations creating a climate that is conducive to business development. 
Various forms and signs of institutions perceptible within a business cluster 
constantly interact and influence one another. It should be emphasised that 
not only those of formal but also of informal nature help clusters actively 
adjust to the changes occurring in a turbulent environment. Thus, 
institutional dimension of clusters determines the level of their 
competitiveness. 
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